Monday, August 30, 2004

Why is common courtesy so uncommon?

The examples I will use all involve cell phones. This is not a rant against that most useful device but against those self-absorbed cretins who apparently are incapable of recognizing that anyone else around them might have equally valid rights and responsibilities.

Twice this last weekend I was forced to wait in line at a grocery check-out line while the customer being helped was paying absolutely no attention to the cashier because they were too preoccupied with a phone conversation. They would run their card through the machine then turn and natter away about something inconsequential (at least to me) while the clerk waited for them to complete the transaction.

The problem here isn't the cell phones. They might just have easily been deep in a conversation with someone who accompanied them. The problem is their complete lack of courtesy and respect for the people who were serving them and those in line behind them. The second time I observed this, the clerk tried to get the woman's attention and ask her to complete her transaction and she actually turned her back on him to carry on with the conversation.

The clerk shrugged, placed the bagged groceries on the ground, voided the transaction and went to the next customer in line. When the woman discovered what had happened she was furious and called the manager over. The manager quietly told her they would re-process her transaction when she had the time to attend to her part of the transaction at which point she stormed out of the busy store leaving the groceries behind. Those of us still in line applauded.

This same weekend I had a bit of driving to do. Weekend driving in Los Angeles is trying enough without idiots behind the wheel but on three separate occasions traffic was held up at intersections by drivers who had failed to use the left turn lane and just decided to stop in the regular lane until someone would let them in. Coincidentally, all three drivers were women and all three were on their phones when these incidents occurred. This wasn't the freeway where the next offramp is four miles away, this was right on the border of Beverly Hills where practically every block has a light. If you miss a left a one light, you can turn at the next one.

The only way we're going to have any impact on this attitude is by ceasing to be polite and unassuming. Like the checker who simply voided the transaction, we need to stop deferring to rude and obnoxious people whose sense of self importance is exceeded only by their rudeness.

From this point on, I shall show no mercy to the rude. They will be publicly embarrassed at every opportunity.

Sunday, August 29, 2004

Transformation Vehicle or Frankenstein?

Former Army Chief of Staff Shinseki pushed through the acquisition of the Stryker AFV (armored fighting vehicle) as the means to create a “medium” armored force capable of rapid deployment unlike our current “heavy” forces with their M1 tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles that are too heavy to easily deploy except by ship. The concept was to purchase existing vehicles and weapons systems as an interim step to equip a force able to survive not by weight of armor and guns but by virtue of their situational awareness and speed. This concept, while certainly a means to make the Army viable in terms of rapid deployment has been flawed by sweetheart deals with defense contractors and legislators.

Let’s take a look at the Army’s requirements for a “medium” fighting vehicle and see just how well the Stryker fits in comparison to the M113 which is already in the Army’s inventory (the Army has 7,000 M113s in storage) and other commonly available vehicles.

Rapidly deliverable by air
The whole key to the procurement of the Stryker was the development of the rapidly deployable IBCT (Interim Brigade Combat Team), a force of some 6,000 soldiers that could be deployed anywhere in the world within 96 hours. The basic table of organization and equipment for these brigades calls for over 1,000 vehicles of which perhaps 500 or so are actual fighting vehicles or armored in some way and some 6,000 troops. The concept called for deployment from the continental United States by C-17 and C-5 and in-theater deployment by C-130. As the current Air Force inventory of C-5 and C-17 aircraft is roughly two hundred airframes, it should be obvious that such a deployment in four days would require all of these aircraft flying multiple trips and still not meet the deadline.

A recent GAO study showed this concept is impossible . . . but the Army moved forward with it anyway.

To unimproved airstrips by C-130
The absolute maximum take-off capacity of a C-130 is approximately 38,000 Lbs at sea level. So, if you factor out a dozen troops (Avg. weight 250 Lbs for each soldier with their personal equipment), a hundred gallons of fuel (~700 Lbs) or so and another thousand pounds of ammunition, you are left with a maximum weight for a single IFV of around 33,000 pounds. If you use the “normal” payload of 34,000 Lbs, the vehicle weight cannot exceed 29,000 Lbs. The IFV is also constrained by the interior dimensions of the C-130; the vehicle dimensions cannot exceed a height of 9’ and a width of just over 8’.

The Stryker IFV weighs in at 38,000 Lbs empty. This means the crew, fuel and munitions would have to fly in a second aircraft. This “max weight” also reduces the range of the C-130. (When the Pentagon wanted to show off their new vehicle in DC, they had to use a C-17 to fly it in because the C-130 would have been too overloaded to fly from the base to DC!

The Stryker relies on a complex and maintenance-intensive “kneeling suspension” to reduce the height to under 9’ so it can enter the cabin of a C-130 – only after everything (weapons, antennas, etc.) has been stripped from the vehicle. There is only about 1½” of clearance so this loading and unloading is pretty tricky - just the ticket when bullets may be flying.

The M113 weighs 29,000 Lbs and easily fits in a C-130 with almost a foot of clearance vertically and horizontally. The M2 Bradley weighs 50,000 Lbs so any plans to airlift them are pointless.
Advantage, tracked M113

A transport distance of 1,000 miles
Most C-130 cargo aircraft are not configured for mid-air refueling so, the closer to maximum capacity they are, the less fuel they can carry, hence reducing their range. Due to the 19-ton weight of the Stryker, the greatest distance it can be flown in a C-130 is only about 200 miles. This also means it cannot be delivered to higher altitude locations as well. The M113 in IFV configuration is well within the design envelope for deployment from continental bases.
Advantage, tracked M113

Ready to move under own power after deplanement
The vehicle should be able to drive off the aircraft and be ready to move to a marshalling area immediately where weapons and other external systems can be mounted and loaded and communications be established.

If the weapons, crew and other equipment have to be flown in on another aircraft, can you imagine the fiasco on the ground as crews try to find their vehicles? Advantage M113
With a normal combat load of crew and ammunition

The “accepted” capacity of an IFV is nine dismountable troops with gear and personal weapons along with a crew of two (driver and commander) including a basic ammunition load suitable for one day’s battle.

Here we go again. The Stryker is in one plane and the crew and passengers with all the other weapons and their gear are in another. In a rapid deployment this would be an invitation to disaster.
Advantage M113

Rapidly advances into combat
Capable of sustained road speeds of 40 MPH

Tracked vehicles cannot move at the speeds of wheeled vehicles without excessive wear on their tracks, especially on paved roads. Typically tracked vehicles are limited to a route march speed of 35-40 MPH. Anecdotally, this speed requirement is based on the failure of tracked Bradley IFVs to beat the Russian troops in their wheeled BRDMs to the Tusla airport during the Balkan peacekeeping mission rather than any real requirement and it ignores the poor record of wheeled BRDMs in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

The Stryker IS capable of highway speeds of approximately 60 MPH. It is also top heavy and subject to rollovers much as are SUVs. By comparison the M113 has a top speed of about 43 MPH. A study performed in the late 90’s calculated average road speed of convoys on paved and unimproved roads in both wet and dry weather. For some reason, Army convoys never seem to exceed about 42 MPH no matter what the individual vehicles are capable of.
Advantage Stryker

High degree of off-road mobility
To be effective in combat, vehicles must be capable of off-road movement in all sorts of conditions from mud to sand and be able to climb and traverse obstacles.

The Stryker (or any wheeled vehicle) suffers in off-road mobility in comparison to tracked vehicles, especially in sandy or muddy terrain. It’s large size makes it difficult to maneuver in confined areas such as the urban environment as opposed to tracked vehicles that can turn in their own length.

Advantage M113

Low ground pressure
The keys to off-road mobility are ground pressure and traction. A typical sedan weighs perhaps 3,500 Lbs yet sits on the bottoms of four tires with a total area in contact with the ground of perhaps 2 sq. ft. giving a ground pressure of 24 Lbs/Sq.In. While this reduces rolling friction and gives excellent fuel efficiency, it also means it is easier to bog the vehicle down in soft or muddy ground.

There is a trade-off between off-road mobility (tracks are best) and on-road mobility (wheels are best).

Many wheeled military and off-road vehicles achieve a lower ground pressure by reducing tire pressure when off-road which increases the tire surface in contact with the ground, thus reducing ground pressure and improving traction. Unfortunately, reducing tire pressure radically increases the tire wear. Tires with a road life of 25,000 miles may have an off-road/reduced pressure life of only 1-2,000 miles.

This sort of system also requires thin, flexible sidewalls on the tires which makes them much more vulnerable to small arms fire. An automatic system to regulate tire pressure also adds dramatically to the vehicle’s complexity.

Tracked vehicles have the entire lower track surface in contact with the ground so they usually exhibit much lower ground pressure; hence much better traction and mobility than wheeled vehicles. Typically, tracked IFV ground pressure is 6-8 Lbs/Sq.In.).

Field tests of the Stryker at Ft. Irwin and experiences in Iraq show that tire wear is incredibly rapid on this heavy, awkward vehicle. The large turning radius makes the Stryker difficult to maneuver in tight areas such as urban and suburban locales.
Advantage M113

Some amphibious capability
Vehicles need to be able to traverse rivers under their own power so they need to be somewhat waterproof for fording shallow streams as well as have a means of propulsion for deeper waters.
The Stryker has no ability to swim like the M113.
Advantage M113

Carries an infantry squad easily
The Stryker carries two crew and a nine-man dismountable infantry squad. Drivers and vehicle commanders must be drawn from the smallest 5% of Army troops due to the design of the vehicle. The Fort Irwin war games brought complaints from troops unable to properly stow equipment, don protective gear or even drink from a canteen due to the cramped quarters in the vehicle. By comparison, a M113 carries a dismountable squad of ten and the crew suffers from no size requirements.
Advantage M113

Offers protection from common threats
Current weapons can be categorized as kinetic, kinetic/blast and shaped charge weapons.

Kinetic weapon protection up to 14.5 mm
IFVs need to protect their occupants from expected direct fire and indirect fire. This means armor heavy enough to shrug off artillery or mortar fragments as well as direct fire from infantry weapons up to 14.5 mm HMG (heavy machine gun) fire. In today’s technology, this means a thick (1” or more) shell of hardened steel, aluminum or even titanium. Thinner armor can be employed if it is angled at an acute angle to deflect some projectiles or present a thicker cross-section to chemical weapons. For example, a one-inch plate mounted at a 45º angle has an effective thickness of almost 1.5” to a horizontal projectile.

The Stryker uses angled plate armor, effectively giving it greater protective capability without added weight. Unfortunately, this means much of the interior of the vehicle is composed of odd-shaped areas unsuitable for storage – hence reduced usable interior volume.

By comparison, the M113 is seven feet shorter, a foot narrower and almost two feet shorter but due to the flat side configuration has a greater interior capacity than the Stryker.

Both the Stryker and the M113 require additional appliqué armor to be able to resist 14.5mm heavy machine gun fire. On the M113, this adds approximately 6,500 Lbs to the gross vehicle weight and due to the larger size of the Stryker, its ceramic appliqué will be even heavier. The M113 is still C-130 transportable with the armor applied but the Stryker is not
Chemical warhead protection up to RPG-7s.

Recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan show that the RPG and other shaped charge weapons are a major threat especially in tight environments such as built-up areas, forest, jungle or any terrain where the vehicle can be approached within 200 meters or so. Shaped charge warheads destroy their target by using shaped explosive charges to create a super hot plasma that burns through armor rather than depending on the mass and velocity of the projectile to penetrate the armor.

A shaped charge warhead can be defeated in three ways:

Passive (traditional) armor
The RPG-7 can penetrate up to 11” of mild steel. Advanced composite armor such as the Chobham armor on the M1 tank can defeat these weapons but little else can. Weight can often be reduced by angling the armor so that projectiles would glance off. Unfortunately, this often makes the vehicle larger for the same capacity then flat armor.

Vehicles that depend on thickness of armor alone are usually too heavy to be air transportable in usable quantities. For example a C-5 can only carry a single M1 tank.

Explosive reactive armor
Basically, the vehicle is covered with explosive blocks that are set off when the warhead hits and disrupt the plasma charge so it cannot penetrate. Unfortunately, newer shaped charge weapons often use a tandem warhead designed to defeat this type of armor.

Standoff armor
A metallic mesh or slats are mounted about six inches away from the actual skin of the vehicle. When the warhead explodes on the mesh the effect of the plasma is diffused by the distance from the actual skin of the vehicle.

Due to the angled plate design of the Stryker, standoff armor adds nearly two feet to the size of the vehicle in every dimension. By comparison, the Israelis have a mesh armor overlay kit for the M113 that only adds about 1 foot to the overall dimensions so it will still fit in a C-130. With the slat armor installed the Stryker won’t fit in a C-130 and is too heavy to carry in any case.
Advantage M113

Mine and IED protection
Mines and improvised explosive devices typically kill vehicles with a blast effect that can blow entire wheels and suspension components off the vehicle or even overturn the vehicle itself. Typically, protection against mines and IEDs consists of passive armor to deflect the blast from the passenger/cargo compartment and mass to prevent overturning.

The Stryker, M113 and Bradley M2 all depend on passive armor and mass to defeat mines and IEDs. Both the Stryker and M113 have additional armor kits to help reduce this threat although they make the vehicles even heavier. The Stryker has a minor advantage here in that it can still maneuver with one wheel blown off while a tracked vehicle cannot.
Advantage Stryker

More cost effective to operate than existing equipment
The experience of the USMC and the Canadian Army have shown that earlier, lighter and less complex versions of the Stryker LAV did not offer cost savings in comparison to tracked vehicles such as the M113

Early figures from the Stryker brigades show costs per mile are five to ten times as great as the M113. Early Strykers averaged $52/mile to operate and the Army hopes to get that down to $25/mile or about eight times the operating cost of a M113.
Advantage M113

High percentage of common components with other brigade vehicles
Common chassis and drive train to reduce spare parts inventories
This is one concept the Army got right. Presently the Army fields a bewildering variety of fighting vehicles that have little more in common than light bulbs, diesel fuel and oil. If there were only one or two “standard” chassis, the logistical trail would be further reduced by commonality of drive train and other parts such as tires, tracks, fuel filters, etc.

Like the M113, the Stryker is designed to be produced in several configurations using a common chassis for multiple roles such as infantry carrier, ambulance, mortar carrier, air defense vehicle, TOW anti-tank vehicle, etc. In either case, turreted vehicles (TOW, air defense and light gun system) would need to travel in C-17s or C-5s due to the added height and weight. The M113 is already in service throughout the Army so parts and logistic plans are already in place.
Advantage M113

Multiple vehicle versions to fulfill different needs
The intent is to develop several different versions of the “interim” vehicle:

  1. Infantry carrier – cramped quarters for the infantry squad and a remote controlled .50 Cal. HMG or 40mm grenade launcher that is unstabilized and cannot be fired accurately when the vehicle is moving.
  2. Command vehicle – by the time you fill a Stryker with all the communications gear required for a command vehicle there is practically no room for a commander and staff.
  3. Reconnaissance vehicle – it strikes me as unlikely that you can sneak up on anyone driving a vehicle the size of a school bus!
  4. Anti-tank guided missile (TOW) carrier – The Army and several foreign military forces already use the M113 for this purpose.
  5. Mortar carrier – unlike the M113 mortar carrier, the Stryker can’t fire the standard 120mm mortar; they are using an Israeli variant with a recoil management system that can’t be dismounted. If they were to use the standard mortar, they would have to set it up outside the vehicle, leaving them vulnerable to counter battery fire and unable to “shoot and scoot.”
  6. Advanced gun system carrier – a three-man mini-tank, the AGS version has developed serious problems in performance as well as safety.

The Army already has a tracked gun system, the M-8, and back in the 80s, decided a workable wheeled gun system was unlikely as a wheeled vehicle takes approximately two minutes to hunker down on it’s suspension so it can fire without tipping over!

Advantage M113

Common C4 systems in most vehicles
The military has a bewildering array of purpose-built communications systems that are often specific to a certain vehicle or even a specific version. This variety needs to be reduced in number and designed to share common rack mounts to further reduce the complexity of the logistics trail. New developments in computerized (hence software controlled) communications are beginning to address this issue but there is a long ways to go before any vehicle can be quickly configured to communicate with other vehicles, aircraft and even remote case stations via satellites.

This issue is essentially vehicle independent although the already cramped Stryker is more difficult to fit with additional communications.

Advantage none

Conclusions
1. The Stryker does not meet the requirements set forth by the Army nearly as well as the existing M113 of which the Army has several thousand in storage.
2. The cost to upgrade existing M113s is perhaps 1/10th the cost of acquiring Strykers to outfit an interim brigade for test purposes.
3. The Stryker is incapable of mounting the Bradley 25mm turret whereas the M113 has already
4. The Stryker is incapable of rolling off a C-130 ready to deploy and fight.
5. The operating cost per mile of the Stryker ($53/mile) is more than ten times the operating cost of the M113 ($3/mile).

About the only place the Stryker would be a better fit than the M113 is in long-range convoy protection where they would be able to accompany the trucks at faster speeds. So, if the only mission of the Army is to escort convoys of trucks over Iraqi or Afghani highways, the Stryker is probably a better fit. If the Army expects to accomplish other missions the Stryker is oversized, overweight, overpriced, too cramped, too top heavy and too vulnerable.

I also find it interesting that the initial program managers of this project are now highly paid employees of the manufacturer of the vehicle, which is not even, manufactured in the United States.

Over $700 million is being spent in Hawaii to prepare a base for the Stryker brigade assigned there while $1.2 billion is being spent to accommodate another Stryker brigade in Alaska. Is it any coincidence that Senators Inouye (HI) and Stevens (AK) used their positions to push through the procurement?

The original plan was to equip six brigades with this “interim” vehicle at a cost of some $12-15 BILLION even before the vehicle was approved by the military. With an individual unit cost in excess of $3,500,000 each the Stryker is overpriced, overweight and oversold.

Presently the Army has several THOUSAND M113s in storage that can be brought up to the current M113A3 standard for approximately $300,000 each (1/10th the cost of a new Stryker). They are transportable by C-130 unlike the Stryker and appliqué armor kits that are HMG and RPG resistant are already available from various European, Israeli and American sources.
Recent advances in track technology offer the potential to add ten miles per hour to the M113’s top speed (rubber/composite band tracks), reduce crew fatigue and noise levels and improve mileage further reducing any road speed advantage held by the Stryker.

This is an interim vehicle to be used as a test bed for new technologies so why are we spending so many dollars on the vehicle rather then the technologies? I could understand equipping a single brigade as a test bed for new technologies but six actual combat brigades equipped with a vehicle that doesn’t even meet the basic requirements for it’s initial acquisition is little more than criminal negligence on the part of the Army leadership and Congressional oversight.