The Joy of Journalism

Or, the joy of no-win Q & A's

Bob Woodward has a wonderful article in the Washington Post today; twenty-two questions he wants to ask Senator Kerry. Based on information he acquired in questioning President Bush and members of his administration last year for his book, “Plan of Attack,” these questions are both insightful (Bob is no slouch) and sometimes classic examples of the “when did you stop beating your wife” style of journalism that all too often overcomes even the best journalist.

I’ll run through them here with a few comments of my own.

1. On Nov. 21, 2001, just 72 days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush took Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld aside and said he wanted to look at the Iraq war plans. Bush directed Rumsfeld not to talk to anyone else, including the National Security Council members and the CIA director.
Questions: If a President Kerry wanted to look at war plans pertaining to a particular country or threat, how would he go about it? Who would be included? What would the general war-planning process be in a Kerry administration? Was it reasonable to look at Iraq at that time?

President Bush, knowing full well that any “official” notice of anything by the President reverberates throughout the administration, asked to look at the plans privately before making any decision to take official notice. Is this really such a telling thing? And how does this relate to the war-planning process in general? Either Mr. Woodward is being disingenuous with his statement here or he is asking a question that has no relation to the statement. “When, Mr. President. Did you start picking out bombing targets in your jammies with the First Lady at night?”

2. The CIA was asked in late 2001 to do a "lessons learned" study of past covert operations in Iraq and concluded that the CIA alone could not overthrow Saddam Hussein and that a military operation would be required. The CIA soon became an advocate for military action.
Questions: How can such advocacy be avoided? The CIA argued that a two-track policy -- negotiations at the U.N. and covert action -- made their sources inside Iraq believe the United States was not serious about overthrowing Saddam. Can that be avoided? How can diplomacy and covert action be balanced?

Here again, the statement and the question are not in synch. The CIA concluded that they were not able to overthrow Saddam with their assets and, if the object were to “overthrow” Saddam, military means would be required to do so. The media has already managed to discredit the CIA in regards to their intelligence activities in Iraq and now Mr. Woodward wants to know how decisions made by the discredited agency can be avoided. Watching the United States dance around with the UN while trying to find covert operatives in a country full of internal security spies would lead anyone to think we weren’t serious.

3. In January 2002 President Bush gave his famous "axis of evil" speech singling out Iraq, Iran and North Korea as threats.
Questions: Was this speech too undiplomatic? How would a President Kerry frame the issues and relations with Iran and North Korea? Do you consider these two countries part of an axis of evil now?

Was President Roosevelt’s “day that will live in infamy” speech before the combined houses too inflammatory? Singling out three countries run by whackos that make a practice of referring to us in less than positive terms when we’ve just been attacked really doesn’t seem terribly inflamatory compared to the way they speak about us.

4. On Feb. 16, 2002, the president signed a secret intelligence order directing the CIA to begin covert action to support a military operation to overthrow Saddam, ultimately allocating some $200 million a year. Bush later acknowledged to me that even six months later, in August, the administration had not developed a diplomatic strategy to deal with Iraq.
Questions: How should military planning, CIA activities and diplomacy (and economic sanctions and the bully pulpit) fit together to form a policy?

Hey, a real question! Of course it ignores the issue of whether or not there was any way to deal with Iraq diplomatically. I mean, you’ve got a thug with his own country and army, a United Nations busy taking a cut off the top of the thug’s oil profits and putative allies doing a booming business selling embargoed weapons to the thug; and you want a diplomatic solution short of bending over and kissing something goodbye?

5. On May 24, 2002, Gen. Tommy Franks and the Pentagon's Joint Staff began work on stability operations to follow combat in Iraq. This was about 10 months before the Iraq war started. But it was not until seven months later, in January 2003, that President Bush became involved in the aftermath planning.
Questions: How would you make sure that there was sufficient planning for both the war and the peace? What aspects would you want to be personally involved in or aware of as president?

Obviously the President has nothing better to do than get involved in military planning on a detailed level. Why don’t we close down the Pentagon and fire all those soldiers and generals so the White House can run the war like we did in 1812? Do ya think that just maybe it took the Pentagon ten months to figure out how to do something we haven’t had to plan for since 1945? Maybe it took them that long to develop the plan to the point that it was ready for executive oversight?

6. On June 1, 2002, President Bush announced his preemption doctrine.
Questions: Do you agree with it? What are the acceptable conditions for preemptive war? Bush has said that he believes the United States has a "duty to free people," to liberate them. Do you agree? Under what circumstances?

Asking a Presidential candidate if he agrees with the policy of a sitting President is certainly valid. Asking the same candidate what he thinks about spreading democracy abroad is also valid. Here is a rational pair of questions any candidate should be asked.

7. In July 2002, President Bush secretly ordered that some $700 million be spent on 30 major construction and other projects to prepare for war. Congress was not involved or informed.
Questions: How would you seek a relationship with the leaders of Congress so that they would be informed of such secret work? Should congressional leaders have an idea where you are heading? What should be the overall role of Congress in preparing for war?

My first question here is whether or not these funds were under the direct, discretionary control of the President. If he had the legal right to spend these funds, the question is moot. Of course Mr Woodward knows that Congress is a sieve so far as information goes. Any secret information given to Congress usually ends up on the front page of the Washington Post within a day or so of its release to Congress.

The final question seems a bit silly in a constitutional sense. Muddied since the Gulf of Tonkin, only Congress has the power to declare war. Of course, Mr. Woodward really wants the opinion of a sitting Senator about the President usurping the role of Congress.

8. In August 2002 (about seven months before the start of war in March 2003), Secretary of State Colin Powell told the president over a two-hour dinner that an Iraq war would have consequences that had not been considered or imagined. He said that an invasion would lead to the collapse of Iraq -- "You break it, you own it."
Questions: What would you do after receiving such a clear warning from a senior cabinet officer or other person with comparable experience?

I would imagine that this was the point at which the President would mention that he already had the military working on a post-combat scenario. I wonder if Mr. Woodward forgot what else the President mentioned about this dinner. Can you say, “out of context?”

9. On Nov. 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council unanimously (15 to 0) passed Resolution 1441 on new weapons inspections in Iraq. Powell thought it was a critical victory, putting the United States on the road to diplomatic success.
Questions: What did this mean, now that Saddam seemed isolated and friendless in the world? Was strategic victory -- getting Saddam out of power -- possible through diplomacy or by continuing diplomacy and weapons inspections?

Ah ha! Let’s send Hans Blix, the Mr. Magoo of weapons inspectors, back into Iraq. I have to respect Secretary Powell for his record of service to this country and his desire to exhaust every effort before having to put troops in harms way. Of course, this “diplomacy” had been going on for a dozen years with no real effect except for padding the bank accounts of some UN officials and European businessmen.

10. In November-December 2002, major U.S. force deployments began but were strung out to avoid telling the world that war was all but inevitable and that diplomacy was over. Rumsfeld told the president that the large U.S. divisions could be kept in top fighting shape for only two to three months without degrading the force.
Questions: How might a President Kerry have handled this? What is the role of momentum in such a decision-making process?

Master of the obvious! Use secrecy to avoid letting Saddam know we’re getting ready to invade if he won’t give up his WMDs? Even Homer Simpson could answer this one!

11. On Dec. 21, 2002, CIA deputy John McLaughlin gave a major presentation to the president on the intelligence evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The president was not impressed and asked where the good, strong intelligence was. CIA Director George Tenet twice assured the president that the WMD case was a "slam dunk."
Questions: What might a President Kerry have done when he smelled weakness in an intelligence case?

Another perfectly valid example of, “when did you stop beating your wife.” We have an agency we spend billions of dollars on every year. If you aren’t going to believe them, why pay their salaries? Post-game quarterbacking is always easier – you already know the score.

12. On Jan. 9, 2003, the president asked Gen. Franks: What is my last decision point? Franks said it would be when Special Forces were put on the ground inside Iraq.
Question: Had the president already passed his last decision point when he ordered such a large military deployment and such extensive CIA covert action to support the military?

Please sir, put the stick down. Your wife has had enough. The President asked the general a military question. Mr. Woodward is asking a political question instead. Pulling the troops back after they had been deployed would have political consequences, not military ones.

13. Around this time, in January 2003, Rumsfeld told the president that he was losing his options, and that after he asked U.S. allies to commit forces, it would not be feasible to back off. Rumsfeld asked to brief the Saudi ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Vice President Cheney, Gen. Richard Myers and Rumsfeld briefed Bandar on Jan. 11, 2003, telling him "You can count on this" -- i.e., war.
Questions: Do you agree with Rumsfeld's assessment? Andy Card, the Bush White House chief of staff, thought the decision to go to war was not irrevocable, that Bush could pull back, though the consequences would be politically expensive. How does a president credibly threaten force without taking steps that make the use of force almost inevitable? Should foreign governments be briefed in this way?

Let me see if I have this straight. Mr. Woodward’s question is whether or not foreign governments asked to be active allies in a war should be briefed about the war prior to the first battle beginning? Duh! How else do you get allies you silly twit?

14. On Jan. 13, 2003, the director of the National Security Agency, Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, issued a formal director's intent on how to support Gen. Franks in a war with Iraq. Previously, on his own, Hayden had reallocated some $300 million to $400 million of NSA funds to Iraq-specific signals intelligence programs to support a war without the specific knowledge or approval of either Rumsfeld, Tenet or Bush.
Questions: Was this good planning? What would be the procedures for such decisions in a Kerry administration?

Last time I looked, the director of an agency does have some latitude on how the funds of that agency are spent. Is the President to sit in on every budget conference for every agency? After watching (and listening) to everybody else deal with Iraq, the director decides to lay on some overtime to see what is happening. I suppose the only real question here is whether Senator Kerry would allow directors of government agencies any independent control over their own budgets or whether he would micromanage them all.

15. On Jan. 20, 2003 (two months before the war), the president signed National Security Presidential Directive 24 to set up the office for reconstruction for Iraq.
Question: What do you think of the timing of this?

I would imagine this is what would be called planning. You’ve set the wheels in motion for a war so you set the wheels in motion for taking control after the war is over. I suppose the President should have waited to see if American military forces could actually win another war with Iraq first?

16. On Feb. 7, 2003 (six weeks before war started), French President Jacques Chirac called the president and was very conciliatory. He said, "If there is a war, we'll work together on reconstruction. We will all contribute. I fully understand your position is different. There are two different moral approaches to the world and I respect yours." Bush was optimistic but took no action.
Question: What would a President Kerry have done about this conciliatory statement?

The President of a country busy selling weapons to your opponent in an upcoming conflict who refused to join you as an ally calls you up before the war begins to tell you he’d be more than happy to help make a buck or two after you finish taking over the country. And this is a conciliatory statement?

17. On March 17, 2003, concluding that Saddam was stalling and lying, Bush ordered war while U.N. weapons inspectors were still in Iraq.
Questions: Was this decision right or premature? Was there any other action, short of war, that would have effectively increased pressure on Saddam?

Is Mr. Woodward asking whether or not President Bush endangered the arms inspectors by not announcing the date of his surprise invasion so they could get out of town first or using that line to give Senator Kerry an opportunity to bash Bush?

18. On Sept. 30, 2003 (six months after the start of the war), British Prime Minister Tony Blair told his annual Labor Party conference that he had received letters from parents whose sons were killed in the Iraq war, saying that they hated him. "And don't believe anyone who tells you when they receive letters like that they don't suffer any doubt," Blair said. President Bush has said emphatically that he has no such doubts.
Question: Can a president afford to have doubt in a time of war?

What a great question, really. You have to answer it with either a declarative yes or no or else you look like an idiot.

Question: What is the role of doubt in presidential decision-making?

This sounds more like the title of a doctoral thesis than a question anyone could effectively answer.

19. Secretary of State Powell has said that he believed Cheney had a "fever," an unhealthy fixation on al Qaeda and Iraq that caused him to misread and exaggerate intelligence and the threat. In Powell's view, Cheney and others -- Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, vice presidential chief of staff Scooter Libby and Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy -- were part of "a separate little government."
Questions: Your reaction? What should or could a president do about this discord among top officials of his administration?

Another excellent question even if laid on top of such a candid statement. Does Mr. Woodward think a President should never allow discord or differences of opinion among top officials? Should a President fill his Cabinet and top Administration positions with nothing but “yes men?”

20. Powell also had said he believed that the Bush administration had become "dangerously protective" of its decisions on Iraq and was unable to consider changing course.
Question: How does a president set up a system or process to enable his administration to alter course or get a clear-eyed evaluation of its actions and its consequences?

Yet another excellent question. Here is an opportunity for the candidate to lay out his or her philosophy of management.

21. President Bush has said on the record that he did not directly ask Powell, Rumsfeld or his father, former President George H.W. Bush, whether he should go to war in Iraq. He did ask national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and his senior aide, Karen Hughes.
Questions: Your reaction? What sort of consultation process would you have on major national security decisions? Would you consult former presidents, even former President Bush?

Firstly, the President did not poll his cabinet or former Presidents on whether or not he should “go to war.” Now we know that this President is willing to make his own decisions rather than asking for a consensus, running a poll or having his “strings pulled” by Cheney or even Carl Rove. I believe this is a different administration then the prior poll-driven one. The question is another excellent question for a Presidential candidate to determine whether or not they would make their own decisions or “poll” their cabinets and former officials.

22. Asked in December 2003 how history would judge his Iraq war, Bush suggested that history was far off. "We won't know. We'll all be dead," he said.
Questions: How do you judge his Iraq war? What do you think history's verdict is likely to be?

Don’t we already know the answer to this one? Has not Senator Kerry already told us he would have done the same thing but in a better way?

I think that what impresses me most about this article is the amount of candor the Bush Administration brought to the whole affair of Mr. Woodward’s questioning process. Admissions by senior Administration officials of disagreements within the Administration are not all that common while still in office.